OFFICIAL DISCUSSION of nuclear weaponry involves much complicated jargon, but rarely if ever descends to the gritty realities of which targets would be hit, when, and with what - if any - military justification. This is the usefulness of the documents on US strike plans and targets which were sent to MPs and a number of newspapers last week. The 80 pages of Top Secret material include part of the US Air Force Europe Nuclear Yield Requirements manual, giving lists of targets in enemy, neutral and friendly countries with precise details of their dimensions and vulnerability to nuclear attack. The strong impression that they convey is that even in the '60s (the period from which they date), the situation was one of overkill with an oversupply of weapons dictating strategy and tactics in a search for credible nuclear targets. The situation will not have become less disturbing since then, for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers have augmented their supposedly 'tactical' nuclear armouries many times.

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The documents are, according to western strategic specialists and previous statements by NATO authorities, virtually completely authentic. The source of the material, however, is ultimately the Soviet KGB, who obtained a massive haul of such material when Soviet agent Sergeant Robert Johnson of the US army filmed dozens of top secret plans at a vault near Paris in the early 1960s. All of the present material dates from this period. In 1969 and 1970, most if not all was provided to magazines in Italy and West Germany. Stern serialised information from Nuclear Yield Requirements in three successive issues in 1970, focusing on plans for nuclear attacks on airfields at Kiel and more than a dozen other West German cities to deny their use to any Warsaw Pact invaders. At that time, West German NATO officials acknowledged that the manual - and other documents dealing with plans for the use of chemical, biological and radiological warfare, 'atomic demolition munitions' and guerilla warfare - were authentic.

The Nuclear Yield Requirements manual, Volume 1, is 146 pages long, and appears to contain over 2800 targets — possibly double this number - throughout Europe and in parts of the Middle East. The targets are not strategic and do not include missile silos, but consist for the most part of lists of airfields and other facilities. These are letter-coded, and include railway and highway bridges, railway marshalling yards and sidings, military headquarters and camps, troop concentrations, waterways, port areas, motorway junctions and major and minor airports.

All of these, in military terms, are soft targets not requiring to be attacked by nuclear weapons. But, by 1963 (and the situation has now become considerably worse) the US had already stockpiled so many nuclear weapons in Europe that there was no other use for them than to target railways, bridges or motorway intersections.

The manual lists 16 different sizes of

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weapons, ranging in power from 2.5 kilotons (one quarter of the size used on Hiroshima) to 1.4 megatons. All would be dropped by nuclear strike aircraft of the US Air Force Europe. These include F-111s from Upper Heyford near Oxford and Lakenheath in Suffolk, together with Phantoms and other aircraft based in East Anglia. It was estimated by strategic specialists that even by 1962 these and other USAF bombers could drop 18 to 20 thousand megatons of nuclear weapons in Europe and the USSR within a 24 hour period.

Such gargantuan statistics are given a more comprehensible meaning by the Soviets' timely re-circulation of this manual. The most eyecatching feature of the US target list is the considerable number of targets which have been prepared in friendly countries — West Germany and Iran in particular - and in neutral countries such as Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia. But the target list for the USSR and the Warsaw Pact perhaps provides more daunting reading, on reflection. For, where the United States has targeted every minor airstrip, railway yard, important industrial sites and road bridge for destruction, the Soviet target lists will have a similar spread for Western Europe. For Leningrad airport, read Manchester Ringway. For Helsinki airport, read Shannon and Cork. For a motorway intersection at Linz, read Spaghetti junction.

Two pages of the Top Secret manual list the country codes used by the US for nuclear target plans. A little comfort is to be had here for the UK. There is no country code listed for Britain; nor any countries in North or South America; nor South Africa or Rhodesia in Africa; nor Australia or New Zealand in Australasia. There are, one can only infer, plans for US nuclear attacks everywhere else, if it became necessary during a war. The manual, for example, contains at least 60 targets in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt, all of which would presumably be destroyed to prevent any flanking move into the Middle East by the Soviet Air Force. The targets include three airfields around Cairo, three around Tehran, one at Baghdad and even one, Habbinayah in Iraq, which was then run by the British Royal Air Force. Unsurprisingly, the manual is stamped on every page 'Special handling required: not releasable to foreign nationals'.

ON REACHING TARGET NO 5576 (Zadar in Yugoslavia), the last listed, there can be little doubt that the nuclear strike plans of the US Supreme Allied Commander Europe are nothing if not comprehensive. Throughout these and related documents, there is little concern for the after- or side-effects of such unmitigated nuclear warfare. Field commanders are given optional target data for ground level 'contact' bursts as well as bursts at some altitude, irrespective of the enormously different radiological effects from fall out. With more than a dozen targets in Schleswig Holstein (West Germany) alone, such a trivial choice for the CO of Upper Heyford would determine life or death for its citizens and those of southern Denmark, if occupied by the Warsaw Pact and the US counterattacked.

Nuclear Yield Requirements is only, of course, a ready reference book on prepared nuclear targets. To set it in context, last week's mailings also conveniently included a selection from US Army plans of the period, which formed part of the KGB's 1960s take.

Four such plans have been sent to the New

Statesman: two of them - OPLAN 100-1 and OPLAN 100-6 — lay out the US European Command's intentions for a general European war. OPLAN 100-1 foresaw a Soviet attack; but OPLAN 100-6 deals with a US preemptive strike on the Soviet Union, purportedly 'in response to unequivocal strategic warning of impending major Sino-Soviet bloc attack'. However this 'definition' seems to be little more than a cover for a general plan to destroy Soviet military forces and 'liberate' East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Such a limited intent in Eastern Europe (no mention is made of the liberation of Hungary or Poland, although there is an explicit reference to West Germany annexing East Germany) suggests that the real intent of the European Commander's plan envisaged less than total nuclear war. His mission was:

to exploit military and political opportunities ... generated to penetrate into certain European satellite areas in order to create situations favourable to successful satellite rebellion against Soviet domination.

This would not altogether be without cost:

the Soviet forces may employ chemical warfare as well as nuclear weapons as a retaliatory

The US did not expect NATO to stay together

As all of NATO may not elect to participate in these operations it is envisaged that a new allied arrangement would be formed following decisions within each country ... (But) if all of NATO does not join in the pre-emptive attack and subsequent offensive operations, as a minimum (it is assumed that) the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Greece and Turkey will participate.

But not without cost:

the nuclear exchange will result in extensive damage to many municipalities and industrial areas, and will require substantial assistance to restore the economic viability in these areas. ... Commanders will initially take measures to protect the health of the military force; (and) prevent undue suffering and distress of the civil populace.

THIS WAS THE ERA when John F Kennedy had publicly pledged the US to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. It was, too, the era of the fictitious 'missile gap' which sparked the arms race to its fastest pace. It was still the era when the spectre of Soviet aggression kept the cold war fires fuelled.

Secretly, according to OPLAN 100-6, it was also the era of pre-emptive US Attack Options

Attack Option I ... the objective is the destruction or neutralisation of the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery forces posing a threat to the US and its allies and allied forces overseas. Attack Option II ... Option I plus the destruction or neutralisation of other elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and military resources

Attack Option II was expected to wipe out 13 of 20 Soviet divisions and 10 out of 20 satellite divisions positioned in eastern Europe. These Options formed part of the US plan for general nuclear warfare, the Strategic Integrated Operations Plan, SIOP, which con-

This is where Nuclear Yield Requirements fits in; OPLAN 100-6 instructs the commander of USAFE to:

deliver nuclear attacks ... in support of Attack Option II of the SIOP and the Scheduled and Regional Program of SACEUR'S NSP (the Nuclear Support Plan of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe)

The plan also envisaged guerilla warfare options by the US Special Forces, which would include the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Copies of these documents have been sent by two of the recipients, Labour MPs Stan Newens and Stan Orme, to the Defence Secretary Francis Pym with a request for his comments on their authenticity. He sent them to the US Embassy who have forwarded them to the Pentagon. A rapid response is not expected. According to the US Embassy spokesman, Political Secretary Jim Dobbins, the US is unlikely to provide a detailed refutation of any parts of the documents which could have been altered or tampered with by the KGB. The Pentagon expressed weary familiarity with the 'leak', he explained. Was it probable that these were the authentic products of Sergeant Johnson's treachery, and the same as the material which circulated elsewhere in Europe a decade ago? 'Nothing would indicate otherwise', he said.

The Soviet circulation of secret US war plans provides an informative focus for the reborn campaign for British nuclear disarmament, which led to last Sunday's Labour Party organised demonstration. The circulation list of the recent documents - nine Tribune MPs, plus 5 periodicals — gave some clues as to the senders, who posted their wares from Paddington and Croydon. The MPs selected had all had dealings with the World Peace Council, which the Soviets back. The periodicals were a more catholic selection, including the Sunday Telegraph. With a touch of Moscow-leaning vitriol, the Morning Star was excluded in favour of the New Worker and Tribune.

Unfortunately, all of the documents were incomplete - only 40 pages of Nuclear Yield Requirements out of more than 160 were sent and less than up to date. However, according to specialists at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the target list will not have been altered, but merely expanded.

